of behavior-in the life histories ofhumans. The underlying paradigms they
differences, and ecological correlates phers approach human populations in a manner more like that of anthropologists and biologists, seeking family patterns and population shifts that correlate with external conditions such as economic fluctuations.' I agree with Watkins2 that any "satisfactory theory of fertility change has to explain differences in the onset and pace of fertility declines as well as fluctuations in fertility." ( p. 28). Yet classical demographic transition theory has not proved especially helpful. Demographic correlations vary in time and space far more than one would expect them t~~,~ if the correlations represented universal principles. As Schofield and Colemans noted, "Any subject which finds it necessary, or indeed possible, to consider its material divorced from an appropriate body of theory must be in trouble" (p. 5).
Humans, of course, are not the only species in which fertility vanes. For other species, the predictive ecologi-178 Evolutionary Anthropology ARTICLE cal rules are relatively clear, although they have not always been quantified. The power and predictive ability of models of fertility onset and fluctuation for other species derive from life history theory in behavioral ecology6-Ecological demography arises from two facts: that the reproductive behavior of humans, like that of other species, is influenced by natural selection and that current fitness is the product of both genotype and environment.' I-13 Here I review classic atheoretical and recent theoretical studies that contribute to this emerging field, exploring the extent to which human reproductive responses to ecological conditions, considered in their broadest context, follow the same selective rules as other species.
NEW PERSPECTIVES
Ecological demography begins with the proposition that demographic patterns, observed at the population level, arise from individuals striving to maximize their successful lifetime reproduction. Genetics, cultural transmission, and the environment interact to produce a sometimes changing set of reproductive strategies. Individuals within a population may experience different environments; therefore, optimal reproductive strategies can differ not only over time, but within subgroups of a population as well. Ecological demography primarily differs from classic demography in its focus on ultimate versus proximate "causes," its focus on individual versus group costs and benefits, and its recognition that the reproductive ecology of males and females frequently differs. As a result of these differences, it uses measures that are based on individuals rather than on populations.
level of Causality
Many demographic analyses involve what evolutionary anthropologists call proximate triggers. For example, we may discover that, in a particular society, men who marry younger women have more children in their lifetimes than do men who marry older women or that younger women command a higher bride price than do older ones. One can ask why such patterns exist at several levels. The ultimate cause of a behavior's evolution is always its impact on the persistence of a genetic lineage through survival and reproduction. Many quite different proximate mechanisms may come into play because they enhance survival and reproduction. When to understand whether a behavior is a functional evolutionary response, the study of trait-environment correlations-of ultimate function-takes precedence. Elucidating proximate mechanisms can enrich our understanding. What mechanisms are useful depends on salient features in the external environment and on whatever internal devices already exist in the organism. For example, fertility declines are predicted to occur as a functional evolutionary response in humans, as in other species, when parental effort enhances offspring success sufficiently to compensate for the lost number^.'^ Different proximate mechanisms can cause fertility to decline: later age at marriage, longer interbirth intervals, earlier "stopping." When, as in medicine or family planning, our primary concern is intervention,l5 the particular mechanism becomes important.
Levels of Selection
Clearly, the only behaviors that can evolve by natural selection are ones that enhance the success of a genetic lineage. Such behaviors are selfish, parental, reciprocal, or helpful to relatives, and therefore enhance inclusive fitness. Genetic altruists-those who, to their cost and others' benefit, restrict or cease reproduction-decline in the population, being replaced by individuals who, as Darwin himself recognized, behave to their own reproductive benefit.16 Thus there is no evidence of evolved homeostatic population regulation mechanisms (contra refs. 14,17,18). If the function of fertility shifts were, in fact, to regulate population, pre-and posttransition societies might often seek to achieve this regulation through imposed infertility. From a population point of view, nothing would inhibit enforced infertility to regulate population,14 yet societies "do not favor childle~sness."'~ Indeed, attempts to regulate individual fertility for the good of the group (for example, China's recent "one child policy) engender fierce opposition.
Genetic selfishness still produces apparent population responses to resource levels as an emergent phenomenon. This occurs because many families, differing in their resources, attempt to optimize their fertility in varying conditions, and subgroups impose legal or religious coercion. These two fertility responses are functionally quite different. The extent to which restrictions impose costly constraints on individual optimization may predict the extent to which individuals will resist them. It would be rewarding to explore empirically when fertility shifts arise from "ordinary" selection-when, for example, having fewer children results in more living descendants for individuals, versus coalition-imposed fertility shifts. Recently Hawkes and CharnovZo have summarized the argu-
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Sex Differences
When women's and men's lives are vmpared, some reproductive patterns must, of course, be similar. For example, the average number of children can never be higher for women than for men. Other phenomena, such as age at marriage, variance in reproductive success, and the rate and impact of remarriage, can differ strikingly between men and women.
Some of these differences arise simply from the fact that we are mammals. Other things being equal, male mammals achieve maximum reproductive success by expending their reproductive effort as mating, rather than parental effort, and by making a generalized parental eff0rt22.23 rather than a truly offspring-specific parental inve~trnent.~~ Female mammals, equipped to nurse their young, do best by producing healthy, viable offspring, and apportioning their effort among specific offspring.
The principal difference between these expenditure patterns is that mating effort and parental effort that is not offspring-specific, unlike true parental investment, may have a high fixed cost: much must be spent before any success is realized (Fig. IA) . Furthermore, later successes cost little compared to the cost of the first success. Thus, although many males will fail to reproduce, a successful male may have many times more offspring than the most successful female.25,*6 This has profound implications with regard to risk-taking and survival in males versus females. As a result, within polygynous species (including humans, whose evolutionary background is polygynous), males typically survive less well than females (Fig.  1B ). This sex difference has further implications for parents: optimal parental expenditure may not mean equal investment in the two sexes.
New Measures
Aggregate demographic measures are inappropriate for many behavioral ecologists' questions because they vary with the relative representation of subgroups. Further, intragroup variation is not reflected in aggregate statistics, making differences between populations or between groups within a population difficult to assess.
Behavioral ecological studies typically measure some form of lifetime success: matings, births, numbers of offspring reaching independence, or numbers of grandchildren. Recent studies on h~m a n s 2~~0 have measured actual lifetime fertility in the behavioral ecological tradition, using measures analogous to the demographers' net reproductive rate (NRR), which calculates the number of daughters expected if all females have mean agespecific fertility and mortality.41 However, the new measures are based on individual patterns, carry variances, and consider children of both sexes. Studies may also measure within-family survivorship and the mortality rates of children, as well as the number of children alive at some specified age. Measures of children reaching independence reflect the "net success" for parents resulting from the interaction of other measures: survival to maturity, probability of marrying, age at marriage, age at birth of first child, marital fertility rate, child survival, lactational infecundity, and so forth.
Predictions from "biological" and standard demographic measures differ.37 When lifetime reproductive patterns, sex differences, or variation in behavior are important, these "biological'' measures are probably more accurate and yield more information than do standard demographic measures.
THE E C O L O G Y O F FERTILITY
Ecological demography considers relationships that might never interest classical demographers. Because population patterns arise as an incidental side effect of individual patterns, rather than as evolved phenomena themselves, ecological demography examines not only the obvious correlations between population and environment (e.g., marriage rate, marital fertility, andcost of living), but individual reproductive costs and benefits. These can include such considerations as mothers' ability to invest in their children, as affected by these women's age, health, nutritional status, marital status, and the length of time since they last gave birth. At- For example, a male red deer may need to wait an extra few years to grow big enough to compete with territorial males, grow antlers, and fight for territory, all to win even a single mate. Investing in offspring (parental effort), however, Is typified by a different pattern: there is a level of investment below which the offspring cannot survive and reproduce; above that amount. the offspring's chances improve, but there is a limit on the amount of investment that will improve the offspring's chances.' 17 Thus. in any species or in any human society in which males specialize in mating effort and females in parental effort, extremely different behaviors will characterize the two sexes. (B) As a result of these return curves, males will tend to be risk-takers; females will tend to be riskaverse. Reproductive failure will be higher and survival lower among males.
tention might also focus on the desirability of marital partners as influenced, for men, by wealth, land ownership, or occupation and for women, by reproductive value and health. Another subject of interest might be the probable success of a particular child as a consequence of intrinsic factors such as child health and sex, and extrinsic factors such as economics, the worth of other children, and reproductive value.
The costs and benefits of any particular reproductive event differ for men and women of different age, occupation, wealth, and health, and lead to different patterns within populations, depending on the composition of individuals, environmental richness, evenness, and predictability. Let us review, then, individual responses ARTICLES 180 Evolutionan/ Anthropology to ecological conditions that can result in correlations between ecological conditions and fertility patterns. These responses can be physiological or social; those that are social may or may not involve conscious decisions.
Male Cultural and Reproductive Success: The Importance of Resource Value
When resource-controlling men can have higher fertility than othersfor example, through polygyny in bride-price societies-fertility tends to be high, but variable. Such conditions obtain in many traditional societies and some preand proto-industrial ~o c i e t i e s ?~,~~ In quite varied societies, wealth or status correlates positively with men's reproductive success.29 Richer Turkmen were found to have more wives and children than poorer men.2' In the pastoral Mukogodo of Kenya, wealth also enhances men's reproductive su~cess.4~ Similarly, among the Meru, who use livestock for bridewealth, richer men can many more wives. 45 In societies as diverse as the Hausa,46 Trinidadians47, and Micronesian status and wealth correlate with male reproductive success.
In some societies, such as the A~he~9-50 and the Yan0rnamo,5'-~~ few physical resources are owned, but even here, status represents a resource. Among the Ache, not only do men who are good hunters mate more often than other men, but their children survive better.50 Among the Yanomamo, male kin available for coalitions also represent a resource. The men manipulate kinship terms in ways that make more women available for mating, and render powerful men available as coalition partners,51,52 so that reproductive success is uneven. In this population, the most successful methods of gaining wives are belonging to a powerful kin group and gaining recognition as a revengekiller.53 Among the polyandrous Toda, a man's centrality in the kinship network is related to his reproductive success.54
These patterns are consistent with the behavioral ecological hypothesis that resources contribute to reproductive ~uccess,~~~35,38 but are not consistent with the demographic hypothesis regarding children as resources and producers. tility and, consequently, larger families than land workers no matter what the economic weather. In addition, family size varies, less among owners than w 0 r k e r~. 3~,~~,~3 , 5 "~~ Land ownership apparently provides a more reliable resource control, a buffer against hard times.
The positive correlation between resources and lifetime reproductive success holds through demographic t r a n~i t i o n .~~ Results hom contemporary societies are mixed.I4 As Low and Clarke3* note, studies using proxy measures rather than actual resource control often yield negative results. This is true, for example, of a study by Birdsallpl which used total fertility rate (TFR) and gross national product (GNP), both population measures, and of a study by Vining,62 which used individual education and intelligence quotients. Studies that examine lineages,63 individual patterns,64 and some census data65 tend to produce positive results. Today, contraception technology complicates the issue; but when sexual access, rather than fertility, is measured, richer men clearly have more sexual access than do poorer men.66
Bride Age: The Importance of Reproductive Value Keyfitz68 used FisherW concept of reproductive value to make predictions about migration, contraception, and population growth. That concept is also useful in understanding trends in marriage age and remarriage rates. Reproductive value, derived from agespecific fertility and mortality rates, is defined as the probable number of daughters a woman will have during the rest of her life, thus encompassing age-specific fertility and survivorship functions. Thus, in societies with a bride price or other exchange of goods at marriage,69 young women might be expected to command the highest bride prices. If high reproductive value is seen as desirable, men with great economic resources may be able to command women with high reproductive value. Another way of putting it is that women with high reproductive value are free to choose men with greater resources, although direct female choice is difficult to demonstrate in many societies. Among the agricultural and pastoral Kipsigis, the bride price required for a woman was directly related to her reproductive With the introduction of western technology and medicine, differentials were reduced.
Poor men might choose to marry older women with greater resources when they can, explicitly trading reproductive value for resource value. Thus in eighteenth and nineteenth century Scandinavia, daughters of upper-middle-class men, who would marry relatively richer men, were considered to be marriageable at the age of eighteen years, whereas daughters of poorer men, who would marry poorer men, were not considered marriageable until they reached their midto-late t w e n t i e~.~~,~~ Richer men, in marrying younger women, gained high reproductive value, but also provided resources. Hughes59 found similar patterns with regard to men's wealth and women's reproductive value in Lancashire, England.
Remarriage for Widows and Widowers
In most societies, widows commonly remarry far less frequently than widowers, a fact that has no obvious demographic or economic explanation. Further, women remarry at earlier ages than do men, and women's probability of remarriage declines with age. Classical have found such patterns puzzling, for women's economic value, like men's, does not decline with age. Nevertheless, women's reproductive value does decline. Furthermore, the decline from peak reproductive value is a certainty, in contrast to the risk of death, which causes lower-than-peak reproductive value at early ages.
Not surprisingly, when men remarry they tend to marry women who are younger than themselves and have high value. This undoubtedly contributes to the fact that men's second marriages a r e more fertile than are women's, even in societies with late ages at first marriage and socially imposed monogamy. Although in many societies the pattern can be slightly modified by the operant sex the patterns are quite strong: widows remarry far less frequently than wido~e r s ;~3 -7~ widows with dependent children remarry at an even lower rate;74,78-80 and widows commonly do not remarry at all when they are
In contemporary society these patterns also persist.81.82
Optimization of Maternal Effort
Variation in fertility reflects the fact that maternal investment in one child may occur at the expense of investment in others. bush-living women not by maximizing the rate of births, but by responding to the conflict between production of a new child versus the cost of that production in relation to the survival of other children. Again, looking for ecological constraints seems profitable.
Among the Ache33j90 and the Ye'kwana,91 nursing women can forage less than others. In some societies, these costs are partially defrayed by having other children assume responsibility for child care. The availability of peers or siblings to serve as caretakers can have an impact on a mother's lifetime fertility. On Ifaluk, for example, women whose first two children were girls had greater lifetime fertility than did others.92 Because daughters assist in child care on Ifaluk, mothers whose first children are daughters defray some costs.
In other societies, wet nurses were hired to defray these costs. A dramatic example is given by H r d~,~~ who found that interbirth interval, fertility, and infant mortality all vaned with mothers' status. The richest women had very short interbirth intervals, very high fertility, and low infant mortality. A linear relationship between infant survival and the cost of wet nurses meant that the richest women, who could afford the best wet nurses, fared best. Among the bourgeois, complexities created greater variation in pattern. Poor women had longer interbirth intervals, lower fertility, and high infant mortality. Wet nurses fared worst of all, having long interbirth intervals, very low fertility, and very high infant mortality.
Abortion, Infanticide, Abandonment, and Neglect
Parental withdrawal of investment in their children seems at first obviously counter-selective. Within other species, including langurs and lions, it typically is not parents, but reproductive competitors (for example, males taking over a harem), who commit infanticide.94-g8 Among primates, the overwhelming majority of infanticides are committed by immigrant males or males who do not belong to the victim's social group.99 Among humans, step-parents are more likely than parents to abuse or neglect children.100-'02 Yet parents can commit infanticide, abortion, and abandonment. Because each infant requires a great investment, investment biases,54 even to the extent of infanticide, can be reproductively profitable.103 Selective reasons for canceling investment in a child include the mother's ability or inability to invest and her access to additional resources such as family or mate, as well as the child's ability to succeed. Other factors are the economic and reproductive value of older children or children who still may be born. Cross-culturally, deformed or seriously ill newborns are at greater risk for infanticide.lo3 Similarly, when circumstances such as too-close births, the birth of twins, or the absence of an investing man reduce a mother's chance of successful investment in a child, the likelihood is greater that she will neglect the child or kill it.1030104 Abortion, too, appears to be more common when the birth of an additional child is likely to reduce the mother's lifetime reproductive success.62~105 As women age and their reproductive value declines, termina-182 Evolutionary Anthropology ARTICLE5 tion of investment is less likely. Even attitudes toward abortion in our society are related to the proportion of women in any group who are "at r i s k of unwanted pregnancy'06
Historical studies of child abandonment indicate that a mother's ability to invest in a child has long been influenced by selective factors such as the mother's health, familial resources, and economic conditions as well as the child's health, legitimacy, and sex. During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in France,lo7 Spain,lO* and Russia,1o9 child abandonment was related to economic factors and mother's abilities. Similarly, although he discerns no pattern, in Boswell's historical overview of child abandonment, 46% (29/63) of the cases he studied were related to maternal ability to invest,"O despite great variations in time, country, and other circumstances. When one considers resource allocation (16163; 25.5%) and offspring quality (4/63; 6.3%), selective reasons were apparent in 49/63 cases, or 77%.
Physiological Sex Biases:

Trivers-Willard Effects
In many polygynous species, including humans, male offspring are more expensive to raise than are female 0ffspring:~5,111 they are carried longer in utero, are larger at birth, nurse more and more frequently, and are weaned later. Trivers and Willard111 argued that in polygynous species under these conditions females in good nutritional condition are more likely to bear sons than daughters. A more broadly applicable statement might be that when the reproductive success of one sex exceeds that of the other (as in elephant seals) or that when parental investment can influence the reproductive success of one sex but not the other (as in baboons), there should be a correlation between parental condition and investment in that sex. 23 Trivers and Willard assumed that mothers' physiological resources for successfully rearing offspring declines with age. In nonhuman species, as well as in many traditional human societies and developing countries, this is appropriate. Whenever the nutritional condition of mothers does not decline with age, a male bias in sex ratio may occur in older rn0thers.36,"~ In polygynous iteroparous species, if a female's condition is good, a bias toward bearing male offspring is predicted to be profitable as a female nears the end of her reproduction, to invest more heavily, with a greater potential reproductive profit if successful (e.g., male-biased sex ratios for older female gorilla^''^). In nineteenth-century Sweden, mothers over the age of 35 years showed a sex-ratio bias toward sons, while mothers under the age of 25 years bore more daughters.36 Such patterns underlie other influences such as parental sexpreference. 114
Other Familial Sex Biases
Because resource control is an effective and widespread strategy for men in acquiring mate~,~9."5-117 resource inheritance biases are important; they can influence survivorship and the likelihood of reproduction. Perhaps no other species exhibits the same degree of resource transfer that can take place through inheritance within human families. Inheritance is frequently biased by legitimacy, birth order, and sex.
In societies with heritable goods, the size of a family and the sex of siblings may have somewhat different influences on men's and women's ability to marry at appropriate times. Within polygynous marital systems, inheritance is strikingly male-biased,lla which is precisely the pattern that would be predicted if reproductive success varies more for men than for women and if male success is influenced by resource control. In many societies, earlier-born sons tend to inherit the greatest proportion of family resources even when, as in nineteenth-century Sweden, more equal distribution is stipulated by law. For Swedish men, only the number of their brothers mattered with regard to their lifetime reproduction, suggesting that brothers compete for resources. In contrast, women's lifetime reproduction decreased as the number of their siblings increased. 36 In many societies, as the total number of women's siblings increases, the more likely it is that the women will be drawn into caring for their siblings, regardless of their sex, at some cost to their own reproduction. Among fifteenth-and sixteenth-century Portuguese nobles, the proportion of never-married men and women decreased with birth order, as did the fertility of married individuals.' 19~120
In contemporary Tennessee, sons in higher-status families fare better than others.12' Among polygynous Mormons, sex-ratio and parental status are correlated as predicted by Trivers and Willard.Iz2 Gaulin and RobbinslZ3 have found a series of other TriversWillard effects in contemporary United States society. They examined interbirth intervals, birth weights, and the proportions of children nursed in relation to income and the presence of an adult male in the household. They found that as income increased, so did interbirth intervals and the percent of infants who were breast-fed-€or sons, but not daughters. Indeed, on all seven of their measures, patterns differed for sons and daughters. In addition, daughters received relatively more from low-investment mothers, whereas sons received relatively more from high-investment mothers.
In many societies, a sex preference in infanticide exists; this represents a conundrum if it becomes widespread and persistent, for, as FisherlS9 noted, the rare sex comes to be more valuable in any mating market. Dickemann124~125 found pertinent biases in sex preference in hypergynous societies. Because women may marry "up" and men "down." but the reverse is not allowed, daughters are valuable to lower-class families, but costly to upper-class families. Dickemann found that there was no single within-society sex bias, but that infanticide was female-biased in high-status families and that son preference was less strong in low-status families. These patterns, Dickemann argued, probably also represent a Trivers-Willard effect. It is possible, too, that otherwise rare male-biased infanticide occurred in high-status families126
VolandI2' examined the effect of father's status on children's survival in a nineteenth-century German parish. The overall sex ratio of children born was almost exactly even; the effect of mothers' age was not analyzed. Deaths during the first year of life as a . result of parental neglect were statusrelated: for farmers, daughters were likely to be considered less desirable than sons.40J28 For other classes, the reverse appeared to be true. Voland thus found evidence of uneven parental investment tied to the perceived value of each sex for parents in different classes.
Total Fertility Rate
POPULATION OUTCOMES OF THE ECOLOGY OF FERTILITY
If individual fertility is shaped by natural selection to respond to ecological conditions such as fluctuations in resources, then population patterns should be correlated with external conditions. We should be able to make sense of fertility patterns in noncontraceptive, "natural fertility" societies. We should find that the nineteenthcentury European fall in fertility, called "The" demographic transition, is in fact variable, and dependent on local resource conditions.
Natural Fertility
"Natural" fertility means simply that there is no evidence, either from historical documents or from starting, spacing, and stopping patterns, of conscious control of fertility within of-living indices, suggesting that individual fertility decisions responded to economic costs.
Investment, Production, and Demographic Transitions
marriage. As a result of the interactions I have discussed, we can expect natural fertility to vary, perhaps with environment, perhaps with subsistence. Demographers have noted, at least since H e n r~, l 2~ that fertility varies across natural fertility societies.130,131 They have used Coale and Trussell'~~32~1~~ m to compare the shape of age-specific fertility, identifying cases in which there is no evidence of panty-specific fertility contr01.l~ Recently, Wilson et al.134 modeled natural fertility and similarly argued that although the concept is useful, it is important not to construct false dichotomies.
Fertility varies greatly among ~t ural fertility societies, and overlaps considerably with controlled-fertility societies.135 All of the natural fertility societies showed levels well below the likely physiological maximum and were remarkably heterogeneous. Bentley et al.136 found significant differences in the fertility rates of traditional societies with subsistence regimes. Intensive agriculturalists had higher fertility than did any other group (Fig. 2) . Similarly, Wrigley and Schofieldl found that marriage rates and age at marriage in pretransition England correlated with various cost-
--
Other things being equal, greater fertility means greater lineage success. But the cost of producing effective, competitive children-who survive, marry, and reproduce-is influenced by ecological conditions. Some conditions favor parents who shift their resources away from having more children and using them to increase their investment in existing children (Fig. 3) . Unless there is a net increase in a family's total resources, the available resources must be allocated to fewer children. Under those circumstances, lower fertility fosters higher lifetime S U C C~S S .~~~~~~* Thus, if parental resources can reduce child mortality or increase the likelihood that children will become well established and marry, the shifts in Figure  3B will be favored. Lower infant mortality, leading to increased population density, increased competitiveness,' 3y, and industrialization are often cited as "causes" of demographic transition. Neither is necessary140 or sufficient to produce a decline in fertility. Numerous conditions can make it more expensive to produce effective, competitive children. I4a3* Perhaps because of the costliness of children, individuals in modem societies make conscious decisions about fertility versus investment. Although accidental pregnancies complicate the picture, parents make deliberate decisions about family size in response to their judgment of available r e~o u r c e s .~~~J~~ When deliberately chosen family sizes are considered, income and family size are positively correlated. When income is judged as favorable relative to others, fertility is i n c r e a~e d . '~I -l~~ Women on welfare64 clearly avoid further pregnancies in order to invest more effectively in their existing children. In fact, as Lancaster and Lancaste1-14~ have argued, the perception of resources probably has influenced fertility decisions throughout human evolution.
This argument counts children as a net cost economically What if, as some economic d e m o~r a p h e r s~~J~~l~~ argue, Figure 3 . Other conditions equol, putting resources directly into fertility is the winning strategy.112 Among mammals, this frequently means that males controlling more resources are able to mate with more females; it aim means that more offspring c a n b e provisioned. When conspecific competition is intense among offspring, parents may win by producing fewer, but better-invested, offspring.14,139
children are a net economic gain for parents in pre-industrial and predemographic transition societies? So far, all analyses of actual data suggest that although the situation is complex, children's labor is never sufficient to result in a net economic gain to parents.143 Parents provide for their children, even in societies in which children work. Even grandparents provide for their grandchildren. Kin help each other, and, as Hamilton148 p r e d i~t e d , '~, '~~ kin-helping tends to be preferential according to the degree of relatedness. Nonetheless, in situations in which children can defray some of their cost,92 families may be larger.
An ecological approach to fertility, although it need not imply any conscious factors, is similar to the demographic models of individual decision and proximate variable^,'^^-'^^ to Mosks'59 "leveraging" approach to fertility, and to Crimmins and Easterlin's160J61 models of factors favoring a shift to conscious control of fertility. All have two important charac- 
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teristics: they do not assume that d l individuals are uniform and they ena n explicit trade-off between quantity and "quality" of children. The perceived nongenerality of of these models may not be the consequence of flaws in the postulated relationships but of the difficulty of trying to explain patterns that are based, in 
